**Cover letter to CISU accompanying the revision of application no. 2535**

Dear CISU and Assessment Comittee,

With reference to the Assessment Committee Note application journal no. 20-2535-UI-mar we have hereby reformulated the application regarding the intervention: Consolidation of Peoples’s Power for a Democratic Breakthrough in Swaziland.

The decision by the Assessment Committee was: Rejection – reformulation needed.

GA and SUDF have worked seriously with this critique and are thankful for its invitation to reformulate our proposal accordingly. In the following we describe how we address the Assessment Committee Note and the reformulations it calls for in the re-application sent today, September 9th 2020. All changes are also highlighted in the new application.

The main reasons for the initial rejection by the Assessment Committee as stated in the Assessment Committee Note were the following:

1. Too few examples to reflect “what has happened” or “what changed”.
2. As the intervention is an extension of a previous intervention, there must be a more advanced strategy.
3. The potential for developing the partners and their relationship has not been sufficiently substantiated.
4. In view of the described fragility the potential for advocacy does not come across as realistic
5. The potential for developing the partners and their relationship has not come across as realistic.
6. The planned intervention is phase 6 but plans for phasing out are not included. SUDF’s only income in 2019 came from CISU, leaving the organization in a fragile situation. The planned activities do not generate any level of income, which makes the affiliates highly dependent on outside funding.
7. 9 people will in total go on project visits, which seems to be at the high end.
8. Budget line 1 reflects some of the core activities in the log frame but is not consistently organized on this basis, which impacts on the transparency of the budget.
9. The spending on, administration, travel and salaries in the developing country of cooperation and in Denmark is assessed as a large part of the total budget. The budget margin is too low as 20 DKK is missing.

In the reformulation we have addressed these issues and made changes accordingly, as well as adopted the new application format. The main changes are:

1. A thorough description of the achievements of the earlier intervention and examples of these achievements.
2. A timeline illustrating the development and achievements of SUDF within the partnership is provided and thereby a clarification regarding the development of the present strategy.
3. A reformulation and strengthening of the section regarding strategy and the development triangle. This includes clearer goals for advocacy, also in relation to the fragile context.
4. The amount of people involved in monitoring visits have been reduced to from 9 til 6, i.e. 2 monitoring visits and 1 finalization visit in total. The startup visit is conducted online. The costs for the participation of a secretariat member for conducting trainings (related to the activities) has been reduced as this trip will be shared with other activities for other partners in the region to reduce the need for flights and optimise the time spent in the Global South. This has been further addressed in the new section on climate- and environmental sustainability.
5. Steps have been taken to address and reduce the donor dependency on CISU. Therefore, the application includes new activities related to this. This includes the formulation of activities and measurable goals for diversifying the funding for SUDF and creating greater ownership of the financial situation within the governing bodies and affiliates of SUDF. Cover letter to CISU accompanying the revision of application no. 2535
6. We have added an external evaluation to strengthen the systematization of learning from this intervention and ensure these are firmly rooted in the organizations beyond the intervention period.
7. The budget has been reorganized so that every activity matches a budget line.
8. The spending on travel, administration and salaries has been reduced and the budget margin has been increased.
9. The intervention’s context analysis has been updated and activities have been altered to fit the current Covid-19 crisis and shrinking civic space as a result hereof. Thereby we ensure that the activities are still able to take place safely, while also having formulated back-up plans in case the situation worsens considerably.

Please note that all changes made since the last application are highlighted throughout the application.

On behalf of Global Aktion and the Global Aktion Swaziland Working Group,

Tina Holland

**Consolidation of People’s Power for a Democratic Breakthrough in Swaziland**

**1. Objective and relevance of the intervention**

Swaziland United Democratic Front (SUDF) in partnership with Global Aktion (GA), the overall objective of the intervention is *to consolidate and deepen the operational capacity of the democratic movement in Swaziland, to mobilize marginalized groups, and ultimately, to achieve sustainable democratic change*. With this in mind, the intervention has three primary objectives:

1. *SUDF will develop and adopt a feminist strategy internally and to build capacity among its affiliate organisations to integrate a feminist perspective in all activities.*
2. *SUDF will consolidate its position as central to the democratic movement and expand its outreach and network by engaging new strategic target groups and partners in the region.*
3. *SUDF will to execute sustained and amplified campaigns and perform mass mobilizations based on a new feminist strategy.*

In the pursuit of a democratic transformation in Swaziland, this intervention builds upon the experience and momentum gained from past interventions in the partnership between SUDF and Global Aktion (GA), which is respectively a consolidated network of community organizers, shop stewards from the labour movement and strong affiliate organizations in order to employ a fundamentally new strategy and a platform for reaching new strategically vital target groups. Previous interventions have created a solid and well trained organisation with a large network of affiliates, representing a large number of people. However, the major remaining challenge is the lack of democratic transformation in Swaziland. This intervention aims to address this by gearing up advocacy efforts in the network built by previous interventions and including new target groups.

SUDF aims to do so by integrating a feminist strategy, enabling them to reach and strengthen its appeal to new marginalised groups in Swazi society, specifically focusing on the essential target groups: women and unemployed youth. This is in recognition of the fact that these groups make out a strategically important part of an essential pillar of power upholding the monarchical regime in Swaziland, namely the loyalty of the silenced population (see section 1.2). After the training led by Solidarity Uganda (another partner in GA’s network) the power structures within the regime was clear to SUDF and how this could be addressed (e.g. educating people during the mass mobilisations). In order to do so, a link is drawn between urgent socio-economic issues in Swaziland with the overall call for a democratic transition, whilst mobilizing some of the largest silent and oppressed groups. As such, this intervention aims to constructively channel widespread political dissatisfaction into a democratic, united and critical movement demanding people-driven democracy.

The intervention encompasses several complementary elements that serve to reach and mobilise these new target groups, legitimately represent them, provide them with permanent structures of organising and ensure that their voices are heard through grassroots advocacy based on democratic tools and structures. Through one major process within the intervention, SUDF and its affiliates will adopt a feminist approach and ensure it is translated into practice both internally and in their external outreach and advocacy. This includes feminist leadership training of the affiliates and ensuring that women and youth play a larger role in the movement going forward. Through a complementary process and using their extensive network of community organizers, SUDF will strengthen their outreach by tripling the current number of organizers and building Permanent Footprints in 30 communities. These Permanent Footprints will then conduct a nation-wide survey focusing specifically on the issues that concern the primary target groups, women and unemployed youth. The results of this survey will then form the basis of a rewritten People’s Charter. This document will guide the democratic movement going forward and will place primary importance on feminism. Finally, the survey results and new People’s Charter will be used as grassroot advocacy tools, both for campaigning, mass mobilising for political change and for stakeholder engagement with strategic external actors. A last process within this intervention concerns financial independence. Through different activities, we will ensure that ownership over the financial future of SUDF is firmly rooted in the member base of SUDF and that a diversification of funders is achieved. The new strategy aims to strengthen the leadership of SUDF and will help develop new ways of mobilizing and organizing unemployed youth and women. SUDF will create a social media strategy that can reach the majority of the population so that SUDF’s vision becomes known by a broad group of the population. These initiatives we call grassroots advocacy, which will swell the support for the democratic movement. The deepening of capacity building, and a strategic shift to an integrated feminist approach, will lead to the consolidation of support for the democratic movement, which will be catalyzed in increasingly large mass mobilisations to keep public pressure on the government. This is vital for the eventual fulfillment of the overall objective. As Swaziland is one of the most unequal countries in the world, the assumption is that a more democratic government will work to combat inequality and protect the rights and freedoms of the people.

All the activities have been adjusted to the present COVID-19 situation, however we har very aware that the situation can change fast leading to adjustments in the activities.

**1.1. Context of the intervention**Swaziland, or Eswatini (as it was unilaterally renamed by King Mswati III in 2018), should be considered a fragile context. This will be shown throughout this section.

**Political fragility**

There is wide evidence of political fragility in Swaziland. The country is classified as “not free” achieving a score of 16 out of 100 by Freedom House (2019). Similarly, in the 2019 Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Swaziland reaches a score of 3.14, the lowest scoring country in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Political parties have been officially banned since 1973 and are banned from participating in elections. The king chooses which members should be part of the parliament, but additionally the king also has the constitutional power to dissolve parliament and appoint and dismiss all ministers, severely limiting the independence of the national government. For many years the African Union (AU) and SADC election observer missions have criticised the electoral process for the lack of political parties, transparency and not fulfilling the AU and SADC electoral charters. The King is also Commander-in-Chief of the Military and Intelligence Services.

There are a number of terrorism and sedition laws that seriously limit civic participation and freedom of speech. Demonstrations are regularly violently shut down by police or are prevented from being held due to the relevant legal permissions being withheld. These measures have instilled fear and apathy within the public to meaningfully participate in political life and to hold authorities accountable. As an example of how the violence has affected SUDF, two members of staff experienced in late December 2019 that their homes were raided, and their laptop and cell phones were investigated, while they were brought into custody without explanation.

Measures taken against COVID-19, including a partial lockdown of the country since March, have reduced civic space in Swaziland even more, leaving little room for public gatherings and freedom of speech and press. This development magnifies SUDF’s major challenges with communicating with their members and countering the distorted, censored media coverage in Swaziland. The partial lockdown of the kingdom ordered by absolute monarch King Mswati III has led to widespread job loss and hunger. Borders are closed, except for returning citizens of Swaziland. The government has largely failed to contain and control the spread of COVID-19 in the population. The United States' State Department’s annual report on human rights highlights high levels of police brutality in Swaziland together with arbitrary or unlawful killings committed by the Swazi Government and its agents following the COVID-19 outbreak. This has contributed to intensifying the existing culture of fear, where breaking lockdown rules provides an easy excuse for police to harass civilians with impunity.

**Economic fragility**

Swaziland is economically fragile on multiple levels. The economy of Swaziland is based primarily on agriculture, manufacturing of sugar and textiles, as well as a large government service industry. According to the IMF, economic growth has declined for the past decade, averaging roughly 1-2 percent. Swaziland ranks 139th of 189 countries in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), globally placing the country in the lower third of least developed countries in 2019. Inequality is high, with Swaziland ranking among the ten most unequal countries in the world by national income distribution. The country’s economy centres around king Mswati III, who is estimated to hold a personal fortune of USD 200 million. The king and members of the royal family control significant portions of the national economy. The king is regularly criticised for ostentatious spending on luxury goods, notably in October 2019, when the purchase of a fleet of Rolls Royce vehicles intended for the royal family sparked protests in the capital Mbabane. In terms of perceived corruption, Swaziland scores close to the African average of 32/100 with a score of 34, according to Transparency International. More than 70% of the population relies on subsistence farming or food aid to meet their daily needs and are vulnerable to the smallest of changes in food prices or climate shocks.

As can be expected, the Covid-19 crisis has further made visible and exacerbated the existing inequalities of the country, as the partial lockdown prevents large groups of society from providing for themselves and their families e.g. by loss of access to local markets.

**Social fragility**

Swaziland remains a very patriarchal society, where polygamy is commonly practiced benefitting men. The king himself has over 15 wives. The country is ranked 138 out of 189 countries in the UN’s Gender Inequality Index. It is estimated that out of a population of 1.1 million inhabitants over 600 women per year are killed in domestic abuse, and that a third of all women have been raped. However, traditional courts seldomly convict offenders for crimes committed against women. Attitudes that excuse and normalise violence against women are persistent. Women are regularly blamed for having provoked the violence, and fears of repercussions for reporting any abuse keep them quiet. Due to the violent oppression, women rarely speak out against autocracy. However, a growing group of young women in the labour market, especially in the textile industry, have created a more critical approach among these women.

In terms of health, reports also show that roadblocks preventing people from entering the larger cities pose difficulties for people to obtain medication for other pre-existing diseases. There are often local protests against poverty and hunger, which are beaten down with a heavy hand by the regime. Today more than one in three adults is infected with HIV/AIDS and Swaziland faces a general HIV/AIDS epidemic. The HIV prevalence rate among pregnant women is currently estimated to be 43%. This further increases the pressure for poor and marginalized people in the country and puts the COVID-19 crisis in a different perspective.

SUDF’s collaborative partner and affiliate organisation, Swaziland Rural Women’s Assembly (SRWA) took part in campaigning for the Sexual Offences Bill (SODV) to become law. During GA’s discussions with SUDF, they have presented a strong case for developing a feminist approach, in order to strengthen women’s rights and participation and to create a broader base for mass mobilisation. The justification for this lies in the fact that a system change is not just socio-economic, but fundamentally also a question of gendered oppression.

The absolute rule of King Mswati III is built on and to some extent justified by the deeply entrenched patriarchal structure of the Swazi society. The strategic shift towards feminism requires a rethink of how all SUDF’s activities can contribute toward the goal of closing the gender gap and challenging traditional attitudes and norms. SUDF and its affiliates are the only actor in Swaziland pursuing a feminist agenda, which sees women as actors, rather than victims or in need of services. The SODV is an important example of the capacity among women already existing within SUDF’s affiliates and the importance for further capacity building of future female leaders (see activity 1.2.2.). This shows the importance of focusing on a feminist approach since women in particular, are a promising group to mobilise as certain groups are already organising collectively. For instance, in the growing textile industry, many women from the lower classes have found employment. Some women have organised in trade unions to make demands on their employer, the regime and resist the traditional customs.

Unemployment rates remain high at 22.85 percent, while youth unemployment soars at  45.8 percentmaking it more than three times the world average of 12,8 percent. The high unemployment rate is relatable to many Swazis and has been a successful unifying theme in past interventions. Also, culturally, young people are discriminated against. The lack of jobs for many educated young people make them move to South Africa. The state remains the largest employer in Swaziland, which problematically hinders discussion on how to tackle these high rates.  Additionally, there is no mention of job creation on the government agenda.  As such this group makes out a large disenfranchised and frustrated group. SUDF and its affiliates provide the unemployed youth with an opportunity to gain agency in mobilising and taking action for change. Thus, unemployed youth make out a significant part of the population with considerable potential for mobilization.

**1.2 Strengthening civil society**

Seeking to strengthen the weak and fragmented civil society, SUDF has in previous interventions performed an analysis of the Swazi state involving identifying the pillars of power upholding the regime. This analysis was informed by the Theory of Change (ToC), a tried and tested concept, shared by both GA and SUDF, which was adapted to the Swazi context. ToC assumes that change is fundamentally affected by the people. In support of this argument, a 2008 study of 323 mass actions, showed that sustained action by only 3.5 percent of the population was enough to guarantee a successful campaign. Adapted to the Swaziland context, it assumes that only sustained mass mobilisation from below will create change. This is because there is a complete lack of incentives to change the status quo at the elite level. The next step is to identify which are the elements that uphold the power of the monarchy, and which can be influenced. In any regime, the pillars are context-specific but often include: military/security, business/private interests, the media, social structures (church, traditional authorities, etc), external actors, and the loyalty of the people. The result of the analysis showed that the pillar most susceptible to change is the loyalty of the people. The loyalty of the people is further split into the people benefiting from the patronage of the king, and those that do not. In the latter group, women and youth are overrepresented, which is why they are the key target group of this intervention. This is also part of the reasoning behind why we see the need to integrate a feminist approach, taking into account intersectional oppressive structures experienced by these groups.

SUDF is best placed to mobilise these groups, as SUDF provides a platform for them to raise their voices towards the oppressive regime. After five interventions, the organisation is well positioned to reach these groups, through targeted capacity building, building support in local communities, and experience of past mass demonstrations. However, expressing dissent still presents a challenge, which is the reason for including new ways of targeting the population (see section 1.1). The only other civil society coalition working for democratic change, Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organisations (SCCCO), is weak in both capacity and on human resources. Trade unions are generally stronger and more outspoken against the government and have increasingly expressed the need for democracy. Within traditional settings, the right to peaceful assembly is often denied for cultural reasons. A number of laws have recently been introduced further limiting the space of CSOs. For example, in 2019, a new law required the annual budget and annual plan to be approved by the government. It also required that at least one civil servant sits on the board of every CSO. SUDF is not registered within the authorities and therefore does not follow this law. Furthermore, government sources as well as observers based in South Africa have advised GA and SUDF that the regime is currently weak. If the state is not able to meet the demands of its employees, primarily in the police and security forces in the form of salary payments, there is a risk of a political transformation. This can be seen both as a fragility of security, in terms of political instability , but also as an opportunity for a positive democratic transition. This further highlights the importance of a strengthening of civil society as the COVID-19 restrictions threaten to obliterate the little civic space that currently exists. It is therefore the opportune moment to implement a programme such as this, in order to ensure the resilience of civil society.

In order to do this, the aim is to involve women and unemployed youth in civil society. This will be carried out on a local community level by creating local community units covering the four regions of Swaziland (Hhohho, Lubombo, Manzini and Shiselweni) that will expand SUDF’s outreach into these respective communities. This organising infrastructure, or Permanent Footprint (see activity 2.1.1), will enable SUDF to include a greater number of marginalized people in their actions. This is a strategy to ensure a strong organisational infrastructure and thus, advancing social justice. The localisation is a strategic and organisational approach to get a permanent outreach in the local communities around Swaziland, in order to ensure that the marginalised groups around Swaziland can participate in decision-making processes. Additionally, the focus on feminism, both internally and externally, will make SUDF a strong voice and platform for women. SUDF will create a place for the women and unemployed youth to be heard and to become an agent in civil society. SUDF and its affiliates will campaign for the socio-economic issues and rights of these two groups especially, and for the Swazi population in general, as a tool to encourage people to participate in actively opposing the regime. Moreover, during the intervention, SUDF will continue to provide support for its affiliates and their ongoing campaigns and activities with social and economic issues. All of this will serve to strengthen SUDF’s democratic mandate and ability to support the rights and the voices of their member organisations and target groups.

**1.3 Climate- and environmental conditions that the intervention responds to**

Swaziland is located in a region that is hit hard by the effects of climate change and is equally vulnerable hereto. Both Swaziland’s water resources and biodiversity are deemed to be at risk by the effects of climate change by the UNDP. Similarly, droughts, floods and extreme weather events like cyclones are likely to be exacerbated in the country, putting at risk the many whose livelihoods depend on farming. Especially rural women are at risk, as they are hit the hardest by the effects of climate change, both economically and socially (with a risk of increased GBV if they are not able to provide for their families).

This intervention seeks to bring this disenfranchised group to the forefront, ensuring their voices are heard (e.g. through the survey) and demands are put forth (e.g. through campaigns, mass mobilisation and in the People’s Charter).  On a larger scale, it is needless to say, a democratic government will be able and obliged to represent and act on the issues facing its constituents and ensure plans for climate adaptation that benefit the population - something that the King has expressed no interest in. A green transition simply needs a democratic foundation, which is the ultimate goal of SUDF.

Focusing more stringently on this intervention, both GA and SUDF  work on the basis of a theory of change based on popular organisation and mobilisation. This necessitates that people can come together to meet, form bonds, work and share experiences. The COVID-19 situation hinders this to some extent - for instance, we have deemed it unrealistic for the start-up visit to be able to take place physically in Swaziland due to current travel restrictions, and as such, we will execute it online (see section 3.6). However, the remaining three project visits (two monitoring visits and one finalisation visit) are still planned to take place physically in Swaziland for a number of reasons:

First of all, our common experiences tell us that monitoring, financial supervision and project management is much better carried out through physical meetings. This also enhances the GA volunteers’ knowledge of the context, the partner and the target groups, as they meet these and see it with their own eyes. The volunteers are also able to participate in activities, giving them a much stronger feeling of the intervention. The visits also ensure that knowledge is spread throughout the group, and that volunteers remain engaged and motivated in the work, playing a more active role and as such ensuring greater ownership and ultimately a stronger partnership. Similarly, the partners in South get to know the Danish GA volunteers that they communicate with on a weekly basis. These visits create an immensely important space for building trust and understanding and importantly, reflecting and strategizing together.

However, we are very aware that the number of flights should only reflect what is absolutely necessary given the reasons stated above. As such, only two people from GA will travel together on each partner visit, and both will fill out necessary and predefined roles to ensure the most productive outcome of these trips.

**2. The partnership/collaborators**

**Swaziland United Democratic Front - The local organisation**

By now the history of the establishment of SUDF has been given. SUDF is one of the few organisations in Swaziland working towards a democratic transition and increased political participation. The stated mission of SUDF is: *To build and consolidate a mass democratic movement (inclusive of civil and political society), constituting the critical mass of interests of the Swazi people, to posit a broad-based and holistic challenge to the status quo.* SUDF has substantial knowledge and experience in acting as a democratic organisation in a repressive environment. Not only does SUDF call for democratic change, it also provides an alternative structure of a well-functioning democratic organisation, which has been developed over the last five projects. Furthermore, SUDF has the administrative capacity and experience to carry out a CISU-supported project. This is clear from the report from CISU's inspection visit to SUDF in 2017.

**Organisational structure**

SUDF consists of a secretariat, the National Executive Committee (NEC) and a Steering Committee and covers 9 affiliate organisations. The SUDF secretariat has three staff members (one female, two male) implementing the day-to-day activities: a project coordinator, an administrator and a finance officer. The employees function as a collective but the staff has a number of main responsibilities: The project coordinator is responsible for the implementation and management of national events. The administrator oversees the project logistics and implements activities in the communities, while the finance officer is responsible for all financial and administrative tasks. In addition to the secretariat there are 30 organisers that are members of the affiliates that have been trained by SUDF. These organisers form the link between SUDF and affiliates, manage activities in the local communities and assist with campaigning.

SUDF’s affiliates represent a total of approx. 130,000 individual members. The affiliates are Swaziland National Union of Students (SNUS), Swaziland National Ex-Mineworkers Association (SNEMA), People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), Swaziland Consumer Forum (SWACOF), Arterial Network Swaziland (ANS), Slyatfutfuka Forum (SF), Lalufadlana Ratepayers' Association (LRPA), Swaziland Unemployed People’s Movement (SUPMO) and Swaziland Rural Women’s Assembly (SRWA).

Furthermore, the flexible structure of SUDF allows stakeholders in the democratic movement to participate in activities without being a member of SUDF. This enables engagement with other progressive organisations, such as the sugar farmers from Vuvulane, i.e. farmers who are not yet well enough organised to become an affiliate of SUDF.

Each affiliate elects one person to represent them in the NEC. The NEC has 9 members (currently two female and seven male), who elect four people into the Steering Committee (currently one female and three male) to oversee the projects. Both the NEC and the Steering Committee have regular monthly meetings to oversee the project and make decisions in relation to implementation, planning and strategy. The representation of women and men in the NEC and the Steering Committee is the current setup and not the goal, which aims to reach a more gender balanced representation in accordance with the feminist strategy within SUDF. SUDF will work towards accepting more female members into the NEC and the Steering Committee.

**Affiliate Profiles**

In preparation for this intervention SUDF has identified the affiliates’ key strengths, which target groups they can mobilise and how many people they can reach.

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Affiliate** | **Number of members** | **Target group(s)** | **Focus** |
| SNUS | 11.000 | 1. Students  2. Unemployed youth | 1. Equal access to higher education 2. Student’s welfare |
| SNEMA | 30.000 | 1. Ex-miners  2. Widows of miners  3. Rural population | 1. Ex-miners health and social welfare 2. Free primary education |
| PUDEMO | 15.000-20.000 | 1. Workers  2. Intellectuals  3. Students | 1. Engages in the struggle for a constitutional multi-party democracy with an elected, accountable and transparent government. |
| SWACOF | 9500 | 1. The majority of the Swazis | 1. Monitoring consumer prices  2. The quality of basic commodities |
| ANS | 110 | 1. Artists  2. The Swazi population | 1. Improving the welfare and copyrights of artists |
| SF | 8000 | 1. The Swazi population in the rural areas | 1. Education on health issues and service delivery for people with HIV/AIDS and TB and human rights |
| LRPA | 5000 | 1. Ratepayers  2. Property owners in towns  3. The population in rural towns | 1. The affordability of rates and quality of services offered by Municipal Councils |
| SUPMO | 35000 | 1. Unemployed  2. Youth | 1. To educate and make the correlation between unemployment, the undemocratic government and the unfavourable economic policies executed by the government |
| SRWA | 23.000 | 1. Women (especially in the rural areas) | 1. To engage women and girls in self-help activities throughout Swaziland  2. Empowering women and girls in rural areas to independent lives  3. Gender inequality |

**Global Aktion - The Danish Organisation**

Global Aktion, previously Afrika Kontakt, is a solidarity movement with roots in the Anti-Apartheid movement. GA fights together with other social movements across the globe to change the unequal power structures that uphold the ever-growing global inequality. These structures are defined by the control a small political and economic elite exerts over the vast majority of the global resources in a manner that sets profit before environmental and human needs. GA, together with its partners, aim at changing the political climate in the Global South into one that empowers those currently excluded from the political decision-making process.

Besides the GA secretariat of six part time employees and three interns, GA has more than 150 volunteers organised in 17 groups, working to support social movements in the Global South. The role of the secretariat is to support the working groups and the board in their daily work and in larger organisational processes. Specifically, GA’s responsibilities in this intervention will be carried out by GA’s Swaziland group.

GA’s Swaziland group is an international team, with group members from Denmark, Sweden and Finland. All members have different academic backgrounds, spreading widely from anthropology, liberal arts, finance and political science. The project benefits from the diversity of backgrounds within the group, as it allows for many different perspectives. GA has a solid knowledge and experience of development in Swaziland. Since 2005 GA have published a newsletter in English every Friday about the current developments in Swaziland. The newsletter has more than 1000 subscribers globally.

GA has established a feminist working group to strengthen and support the development and application of feministic tools and approaches internally in GA and in GA’s partnerships, projects and campaigns. The insights of the GA feminist working group will be used in this intervention, and vice-versa, the learnings of the intervention will be harvested and fed into the initiatives of the GA Feminist working group.

**GA’s partnerships**

The framework for GA's project work is outlined in our Partner Approach. GA has project partners in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Mozambique, Western Sahara, Mauritius and Swaziland. We collaborate with a range of global networks and alliances such as World Forum of Fisher Peoples, Western Sahara Resource Watch, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Network, La Via Campesina, Seattle to Brussels and many others.

GA’s project-based partners are defined as “popular-based organisations”, in other words, organisations which are built on democratic structures, and which promote and support the active participation of their members in decision-making processes. If this is not the case, we assist them in introducing and upholding such structures.

Over the years, GA has to an increasing extent linked the content of our collaboration with partners to the global political struggle against inequality and lack of democracy. We will continue to do so, by always making sure there is a link between the local focus of the project and the political and global structures of inequality.

**GA strategy 2016-2020**

GA adopted a strategy for 2016-2020 in April 2016.  The strategy has 4 thematic areas of action: (1) Power and Democracy, (2) Global Trade Structures, (3) Climate Justice, (4) Resource Grabbing. The current strategy calls for a clear political scope in our partnerships and it broadens our scope to not only focus on the African continent. GA is currently undergoing an inclusive process to formulate a new strategy running from 2021 and onwards. Preliminary meetings on this have highlighted the need for continued support of the democratic movement in Swaziland as one of the successes that GA will seek to further build on in the future, as it is an area in which GA has special expertise and is one of very few actors involved.

**2.1 Results from previous interventions**

In 2008 SUDF and GA began what is now a 12-year long partnership. Together we have implemented the projects *Unity for Democracy* (journal no. 10-807-SP-apr), *Unity for Change* (12-1213-SP-sep), *Building People’s Power for a Democratic Change (14-1557-SP-sep), Strengthening the relationship between the labour sector and the democratic movement in Swaziland* (19-2397-MI-maj) and currently we are rounding up the project *Push for a People's Government* (17-2104-UI-sep) running until 31-01-2021. All projects were funded solely by CISU and have resulted in a well-functioning partnership between SUDF and GA, based on solidarity, mutual understanding and support.

The new strategy and new target groups of this intervention are a direct result of shared analysis of the learnings and results obtained through previous interventions in this partnership. Of these results, a notable success is that SUDF has planned and executed seven mass mobilisation campaigns for democracy, termed Global Week of Action (GWA). It is our assertion that the mobilization of broad sections of the population is a prerequisite for creating the necessary changes that can alleviate poverty.

The main event of these GWAs consist of a summit and a march through Mbabane or Manzini, the two largest cities in the country. The most recent one took place on the 3rd of May 2019 with the unifying slogan “A Push for a People’s Government”. Even though the expected number of participants in the mass march on May 3rd 2019 was not reached, it was still a success (5000 attendants in 2019. The goal was 6000 or more). Interviews and observations carried out during the march confirmed that the participants of this mass march were more politically aware and more vocal about it than before. Furthermore, the GWA received extensive coverage on social media, such as Twitter and News24, and was broadcasted as far away as South Africa and New York.

Opting for the element of surprise, SUDF chose to change the dates of the GWA, placing it just a few weeks before the ILO-conference. This made the government more hesitant to deploy brutal methods against the protesters. This shows SUDF’s adaptability and skill in mobilising in the Swazi context.

SUDF has for many years worked with the approx. 60,000 women in the textile industry which has led to close ties with the trade union. These women often protest against poor working and wage conditions. Politically active and organised women in this sector is a promising new development. Although the police are very savage towards the women, and the King begged them to resume work the strike continued. That is why, SUDF has hired a former shop steward from the textile industry. She has strengthened SUDF and their members' access to this group.

In previous interventions SUDF has strengthened their organising skills and strategies. SUDF has worked with a strategy based on a tripod of mass mobilization, political civic education and strategic lobbying of key local and international power brokers on the question of deploying democracy in Swaziland. Mass mobilization is also a way to increase international awareness of the democratic deficit in Swaziland. This strategic approach has worked effectively as SUDF has continued to grow in numbers of affiliates and members of the affiliate organisations. This can be measured in the increasing number of members and in terms of impact as SUDF has managed to win their space as one of the greatest catalysts for change in Swaziland as well as a key progressive entity. They have gained valuable hands on experience to mobilise more people from demonstration to demonstration by using new techniques and methods. The external communication efforts have, for instance, resulted in a lot more activities – and thus followers – on Facebook (1155 likes and 1188 followers August 16 2020, compared to 65 in 2017).

Furthermore, in the add-on intervention (19-2397-MI-maj), SUDF managed to realign forces with the labour union (TUCOSWA) at the Labour Networking Summit. This revival of the good relations between the labour and democratic forces in Swaziland have already resulted in various co-planned activities, which indicates an improvement in SUDF’s skills in communicating their vision externally, as well as the improved visibility during the last interventions.

As a result of intervention *Building People’s Power for a Democratic Change* (14-1557-SP-sep) SUDF now has a team of 30 trained organizers (17 female and 13 male) who are able to reach out to the Swazi population in urban and rural areas, which has increased the membership base of SUDF's partners significantly. In the current intervention (17-2104-UI-sep), set to conclude on 31 Jan 2021, SUDF’s affiliates have been trained to run campaigns addressing some of the most pressing socio-economic issues of relevance to the target groups (e.g. unemployment, proper health services, student’s rights and gender-based violence). This has given valuable feedback to SUDF on what issues the Swazi population is struggling with as well as strengthened the affiliate organisations’ capacity to campaign. Furthermore, SUDF has grown its public presence outside of Swaziland. Over the years of the previous interventions SUDF has become an organization whose presence is known by most key political players, such as ambassadors, local politicians and other progressive movements in the region. This strategic power has given SUDF the necessary political capital to influence decision makers (for instance in the SODV act, see section 1.1.).

**Timeline SUDF achievements**

The following timeline serves as an overview of the key achievements of previous interventions.

**2006:** Pro-democracy demonstrations took place and the idea of a united democracy movement was created.

**2008:** SUDF was founded as a cooperation between different pro-democracy organisations. The organisations were social movements, trade unions and political organisations and unified under the political agenda of campaigning for the "Democratization of Swaziland". A notable affiliate was the labour movement TUCOSWA.

**2008-11:** First intervention (08-551-MP-apr) in Swaziland, where GA cooperated with FSEJ (Foundation for Socio-economic Justice). FSEJ carried out civic education with the support from GA and CISU.

**2010-12:** GA partnership with SUDF and FSEJ in cooperation. This is the first intervention involving SUDF (journal no. 10-807-SP-apr). At this point all leaders in SUDF are male. Swaziland Consumer Forum (SWACOF) joined SUDF in 2010.

In early 2011 SUDF had 5 affiliates. Due to internal disagreements TUCOSWA leaves SUDF, which forces SUDF to the brink of collapse. However, in cooperation with GA, SUDF makes a new strategy that builds a new platform for the democracy movement. This strategy implies an opening towards ordinary organizations who are based on one issue. The strategy is successful and the number of affiliates grows. In 2012 the Arterial Network Swaziland (ANS) became a member.

**2013-15:** Slyatfutfuka Forum (SF), Lalufadlana Ratepayers' Association (LRPA) and Swaziland Unemployed People’s Movement (SUPMO) joined SUDF in 2013. After expanding the number of affiliates the focus lay on strengthening the national and local leadership of SUDF, as part of the intervention (jr. no. 12-1213-SP-sep). The political capacity increased through more cohesion and cooperation within the organization. SUDF adopts more accountable structures, e.g. ensuring that at least 95% of the National Executive Committee (NEC) members attend the monthly meetings. In these years SUDF managed to be more visible in the local, national and regional political arena.

**2015-18:** SUDF and its affiliates increased organisational strength to sustain enhanced internal unity and carry out campaigns. The affiliates nominate in total 10 core organizers and 20 2nd layer organizers which have been capacitated through constant participatory training (jr *14-1557-SP-sep*). This makes it possible for the affiliates to plan and run popular mass events and campaigns to put pressure on the regime. Addressing the low political activism in Swaziland has been a key theme which the intervention strategy has focused on. First, capacity building SUDF and its affiliates by providing knowledge in political strategizing, security and administrative knowhow was essential for the organization to not only build on its past efforts but also provide a prime alternative of multi-party democracy in action. SUDF has used the approach of “participation through action” so that the tools learned at workshops are used in real time situations. The capacity building of NEC, core and second layer organizers have been successful as they have rallied in their communities and surpassed the targeted amount of people for the GWA. The major difference that this intervention has made is that SUDF is a much stronger organization that can legitimately represent its target group.

**2018-20:** This intervention (17-2104-UI-sep) builds on the previous intervention by further capacitating the SUDF affiliates in order to make them able to take on a leading role in terms of organizing and mobilizing through targeted campaigns within their specific areas of work, such as unemployment, proper health services and students rights. These campaigns are linked to a broader call for a regime change and ensure increased momentum, visibility and membership of SUDF. Also, SUDF is capacitated with respect to organizing, planning and communication in order to provide an effective and stable support network for the affiliates network. In 2018 SUDF has 8affiliates.

Together with SUDF, GA successfully lobbied the EU Commission, which led to the inclusion of Swaziland on a list of monitored countries. Therefore, economic sanctions could follow if the situation deteriorates further. As a result of SUDF lobbying, SADC and AU electoral observer missions are now, to a greater extent than before, following up on the reports from the general elections 2018.

**2020:** Today, SUDF has 9 affiliates, representing a total of 130,000 individual members. This number has increased from 42,400 in 2017 showing that SUDF succeeded in mobilizing massive numbers of people throughout the last 3 years which, as argued before, has made mass mobilisations, campaigning and advocacy towards a democratisation of Swaziland more visible.

**Major achievements the last 10 years**

SUDF has grown substantially from 5 affiliates to now 9 affiliates. It was – and is a clear strategy to continuously expand the impact of SUDF through increasing her network and expanding the number of affiliates.

As can be seen in the timeline above, SUDF has over the years trained their leaders to be able to practice their political and strategic oversight so that SUDF remains united and coherent in implementing its programs. A strong democratic culture has been created in the SUDF and its member organizations. A strong focus on leadership in the staff and affiliates has meant that they know what democratic mandate their members have given them and that they cannot break this mandate.

SUDF has capacity built the affiliates so that they are now aware of the strong connection between the oppressive regime and the social injustice, thus recognizing the importance of a democracy. Furthermore, the affiliates are now able to mobilize and run campaigns (activity 3.1.3). Internal capacity building of SUDF members, leadership (NEC) and employees, has given a greater common understanding of what SUDF wants to achieve and how, as it is reflective hereof. This includes a strong strategy based on a joint analysis. This can be seen in that  feminism now is central to SUDF's work which as mentioned is central in the intervention going forward.

The established team of organisers have worked tirelessly since their first capacity training. This turned out to be the turning point organizationally as SUDF managed to grow not only quantitatively but also qualitatively in terms of sustained mass actions one year after the other. The strategy of linking the challenges of local communities with the national democratic shortcomings has resulted in thousands of people from these local communities actively participating in the activities of the SUDF and its affiliates.

It is in this light that the partnership now proposes a new intervention, which harnesses successes, informs its strategy with the lessons learned and builds on structures and capacity created. Creating democratic regime change is not a process that can happen over night. It takes hard and sustained work and is only possible with the support of the outside world. SUDF is today the central player in the democratic movement. However, SUDF acknowledges the need to end the financial dependence of SUDF on GA and CISU, which is why addressing this also plays a major role in this intervention (see activity 2.4.1).

**2.2 Areas of Responsibility**

The overall responsibility for the intervention lies with the board of GA. The daily tasks in Denmark are in the hands of the working group, which is responsible towards the GA Board in terms of intervention implementation, including financial management and day-to-day contact with SUDF. The working group will also be responsible for promoting public and political awareness of the democratic struggle in Swaziland in Denmark and the EU through national and regional lobbying and advocacy. Monitoring and evaluation will be carried out continuously in collaboration between the GA working group and SUDF, as will the final review of the intervention (see section 3.6). The role of the GA secretariat is mainly to capacitate the GA activists through training in e.g. financial management, assistance with reporting, preparation for monitoring visits as well as assisting with campaign work.

Furthermore, GA will connect SUDF with GA’s extensive regional and international network for knowledge and know-how exchange on topics of relevance to the intervention as well as financial and material support. For instance GA is planning a political partner seminar in South Africa in 2021 which will gather all GA’s partners in the region for four days of discussion, planning and sharing struggles, strategies and tactics and build solidarity and stronger movements.

SUDF is responsible for the day-to-day implementation of activities in Swaziland including planning and executing activities, organising and mobilising the Swazi population. SUDF will report back to GA with quarterly narrative and financial reports (see more on the monitoring in section 3.6: Monitoring, evaluation and learning of the intervention). The division of responsibilities will be based on an Agreement of Cooperation between SUDF and GA, which will be agreed upon and signed by both organisations.

**2.3 Developing relations between the partners**

Throughout the partnership, SUDF and GA have established a relationship of mutual trust and understanding. GA has shown solidarity with SUDF and has been acting as a consulting partner, while SUDF has shared its knowledge on the context and shown to be very capable at implementing projects in the fragile context. Furthermore, the partnership is defined by a common strategic goal and based on democratic values, a relation that is also defined by GA’s partnership approach.

The intervention is designed to continue and strengthen this relationship in order to better navigate the context and to build on the common results achieved.

Beyond the monitoring visits, we are in constant communication via email, Skype and WhatsApp. In the current project, the WhatsApp group consists of GA volunteers and project staff in Swaziland and has had a positive impact on the relationship. Informal updates are given after each activity along with photos, which helps GA volunteers feel involved and updated in the daily implementation of the project.

**2.4 Cooperating with other actors**

The intervention will widen the network of cooperation by building new relations across national borders as well as taking advantage of existing relations within the network of GA and SUDF. GA has a broad network of organisations with sound experience of pro-democratic movements and actions as well as solid knowledge of the context. We plan to take advantage of this by inviting the organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa to share their experiences. For instance GA’s Zimbabwean partner, Institute for Young Women’s development (IYWD) have an advanced feminist approach. SUDF and IYWD have collaborated earlier with great benefits for both actors and their experience will feed well into SUDF’s work of designing of a new feminist strategy.

SUDF started a cooperation with The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) when it hosted an international conference in South Africa, which brought 18 Swazi organizations and more than 10 progressive organizations for a conference on African politics and Swaziland today. OSISA has continued to indirectly support the work of SUDF, as SUDF became part of a OSISA funded project under the Political Party Assembly (PPA). This relationship will be further developed, as OSISA holds a wide network and knowledge base, and could be a potential funding partner.

In an attempt to attract another funding partner, GA and SUDF together approached the Swedish NGO Afrikagrupperna in 2020. SUDF are currently in dialogue with them to set up a meeting in South Africa in 2021 to discuss future cooperation possibilities. This process is essential in order for SUDF to become less dependent on GA (and CISU). We view this as one of our main and shared priorities within this intervention, and even though the negotiations with Afrikagrupperna are promising, we still seek other complementary partners that also can support SUDF financially. It is of great importance to highlight that it is a long process to establish a new partnership, therefore this process is a sub-strategy and the search for new donors is an activity, due to the effort involved..

Another actor within the network of GA and SUDF is the external consultant, Venitia Govender, who has known GA and SUDF for many years. Ms. Govender has taken part in the present intervention (17-2104-UI-sep) and has helped SUDF develop structures on how to strategize, monitor and evaluate on the go, secured skilled facilitators and external experts, helped build team spirit among the organisers, taught in mobilising activities and increased the unity of SUDF through better teamwork approaches. Including Ms. Govender in the new intervention is the best way to continue building up SUDF as she is a trusted partner.

**External actors and stakeholders**

The regime is dependent on external actors to uphold the state. South Africa supports Swaziland through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), an Apartheid-era institution, where the income derived from cross-border trading is distributed amongst its members. However, the distribution unevenly benefits Swaziland and plays a part in propping up the regime financially. South Africa is currently facing many internal challenges and is reluctant to reform the SACU system or pressure Swaziland, for fear of creating a wave of refugees. Further, there are close links between the top ANC leadership and the Swazi royal family. South Africa is not seen as an easily influenced actor due to its local concerns.

The EU and US support Swaziland through development aid. USAID  funds most of Swaziland's health services, while the EU has until 2020 financed large portions of the education system, via direct support to the Ministry of Education. Their interests in Swaziland are strategic and financial; the EU requires Swaziland’s support for implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) promoting free-trade signed in 2016, while the US has a large embassy in Swaziland as a strategic security point in the region. Recently, the US ambassador has been making critical comments of the King, as in July 2020 when she advocated a constitutional change which would cap the King’s allowance from the treasury. In the current constitution, the King’s allowance cannot be reduced. Advocating to the US ambassador, as well as other democracy supporting diplomatic missions could raise awareness of the democratic movement and lead to a more sustainable advocacy platform.

**3.** **Target group, objective, strategy and expected outputs**

The intervention has a primary and secondary target group. The primary target groups consist of the unemployed youth leaders and female leaders as well as SUDF leadership, affiliates, community organizers and shop stewards.  In total this amounts to 250 persons.

The secondary target group is the wider Swazi population, with a particular focus on women and the unemployed youth who are expected to be affected by the outcome of the activities. This amounts to approximately 124.000 people. It is clear that since the overall aim of SUDF’s work is to achieve sustained democratic change, it targets the whole population of Swaziland. However, to achieve this overarching goal, in this intervention the main focus is on the primary target groups, which have a high potential for mobilization.

**3.1 The involvement of the target groups**

**Targeted unemployed youth leaders and female leaders**have been identified as some of the most vulnerable people in Swaziland (see section 1.1). Therefore, they are a relevant group to engage in the mobilizations. Addressing where the unemployed youth and the female leaders are to be found,  the unemployed youth leaders are to be found in SUDF’s affiliates (especially SNUS and SUPMO) and the female leaders are part of SUDF’s affiliates (especially SRWA and SNEMA). These leaders will target unemployed youth and women coming from the four biggest regions of Swaziland, both  rural - and urban areas. These are the people that the first target group aims at directly mobilizing and capacitating through the various activities of the intervention (activities 2.3.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.3, 3.2.1, 3.2.2).

The intervention further seeks to primarily target SUDF leadership, affiliates, community organizers & shop stewardsby strengthening the capacity of these actors to increase SUDF’s ability to continue mobilizing masses for a democratic Swaziland. Although SUDF leadership have been previously successful, it is crucial to keep developing their capacities through for instance training on social media and research methodology, in order to further strengthen the ability of SUDF to mobilize for a democratic change. A feminist focus is also new to many leaders of SUDFs members, thus a new culture needs to be developed and new working methods used to get women involved.

**Women** are an important target group of this intervention. Furthermore, having a primary target group consisting of women leaders and unemployed youth serves as an entry point into the two secondary target groups, because they will be targeted in campaigns and actions that build on the particular demands of these two groups. Due to the current regime standing firmly on the pillar of patriarchy, which leaves half of the population on the outskirts of political life, SUDF recognises the potential and importance of mobilizing women in the attempt to strengthen the democratic movement. For instance, currently traditional structures and practices prohibit women from speaking in public at men’s gatherings which presents significant challenges for women’s political participation. In view of the growing empowerment of the affiliates during past interventions we see a great potential and need for further empowerment of women. For instance, SRWA has learned to carry out mass gatherings. SUDF’s mass gatherings clearly shows the growth in confidence of these women to sing traditional progressive songs and dance to highlight GBV and female oppression in Swaziland. This shows the potential for women as a target group to be further empowered.

By training youth leaders SUDF wants to strengthen **unemployed youth**. This group of Swazis is a significant target group considering that around a third of the population is between 15 and 35 years old (Swaziland’s internal youth definition). Unemployment is a major challenge for the youth, with the youth unemployment rate of 45.8% being twice as high as the general unemployment rate in Swaziland. Furthermore, the youth unemployment rate has been on the rise the past two years. Besides the young and women, rural populations and people with low education levels are among the ones with a disproportionately high unemployment rate as well. The duration of unemployment tends to be very high, most of the unemployed having been available for work for a year or more. Besides, the issue of unemployment the youth are largely excluded from political participation and their influence on policy-making processes is limited. This creates political apathy, and results in increasing violence and despair among the young people, which has been the case in Swaziland.

**The Swazi People** continue to form the wider, secondary target group of the intervention similar to the previous interventions. The ultimate goal is to reach the entire population of Swaziland. Of course we can not do so. But via social media, it is possible to reach almost half of the population in Swaziland. Taking SUDF’s affiliates and their outreach into account, it is realistic for SUDF to reach 400,000 people (more than a third of the entire population). Not all of them will immediately take part in mobilizations. However, they will be aware of SUDF's requirements, and may therefore become mobilized later. SUDF’s attempt to mobilize all segments of society is a long process, which is why the partners recognize the importance of placing particular focus on certain segments of the society. When that has been said, SUDF shows the willingness and the ambition to make changes and progression.

**3.2 Strategic objectives, activities, expected outputs and indicators: a Logical Framework Approach**

As mentioned in section 1, this intervention implies a formulation of a new strategy with a clear focus on feminism. This will empower SUDF towards confronting the foundations of oppression in Swaziland, one of which is patriarchy. The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) below showcases the intervention’s objectives, activities, expected outputs, indicators and means of verification in terms of strengthening the SUDF leadership and affiliates in order to reach the target groups described above. All activities will take COVID-19 into account (further on this later in this section).

**Definitions of activities**

*People’s Charter*: The charter is defined as an internal paper describing SUDF’s visions. The charter describes the overall political demands of a civil democracy by SUDF and its affiliates.

*Permanent footprints*: a process where the number of organizers is to be tripled. Each of the 30 organizers engage with two locals creating a triangle, who will again form new triangles with more people resulting in multiple triangles or cells at the community level.

*Survey*: A survey on the population's attitudes towards social, economic and political issues used for ensuring legitimacy in representing the target groups and additionally as an advocacy tool.

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| **Overall objective:** *SUDF has consolidated and deepened the operational capacity of the democratic movement in Swaziland, to mobilize marginalized groups, to achieve sustainable democratic change.* | | |
| **Immediate objectives** | **Indicators and means of verification (MoV)** | **Activities and outputs** |
| 1. SUDF has developed and adopted a feminist approach internally and increased capacity among its affiliates to employ feminist tools and understandings. | 1.1 By June 2022, SUDF and affiliates have developed and centralized feminism into their strategy and updated People’s Charter.  By January 2022 SUDF’s NEC and Steering Committee have a more equal gender distribution among its members aiming that at least one third of the members are women.  *MoV:* Strategy document; 2022 People’s Charter document; minutes from quarterly review and evaluation meetings. | 1.1.1 A 2-day leadership training for SUDF’s affiliates and strategy review conference with focus on developing a feminist approach.  *Output:* New revised SUDF strategy based on feminist approach. |
| 1.1.2. Review and evaluation meetings (three times a year) led by NEC, staff and SUDF organizers.  *Output:* Broad organizational involvement in implementation and regular opportunities for timely strategic revisions. |
| 1.1.3 Creation of a 2022 People’s Charter (based on results of surveys, activity 2.2.3).  *Output*: 2022 People’s Charter. |
| 1.2 By October 2020, 30 organizers, 20 shop stewards and 40 female representatives of SUDF’s affiliate organizations have been trained on feminist approaches, tools and leadership strategies. At least 80% of participants can express the importance of these in their work and how they will implement it.  *MoV:* Programmes and participant lists; evaluation and feedback reports; interviews with participants; internal report based on findings. | 1.2.1. One training workshop (2 days out of 4) for 30 organizers and 20 shop stewards on feminism in praxis (in connection with 2.2.2 and 3.1.1).  *Output:* Feminism is popularized and taught to SUDF base, who in turn will disseminate these learnings and methods in their community Permanent Footprints. |
| 1.2.2 Women's Leadership Conference for affiliate organizations.  *Output:* Capacity among female affiliates increased, creation of a network of female delegates from SUDF affiliates, a final report on how to employ feminist methods in the organization. |
| 2. SUDF has consolidated its position as central to the democratic movement and expanded its outreach and direct network by engaging new strategic target groups. | 2.1 By February 2021, SUDF has established   at least 30 Permanent Footprints spanning 90 people that  are actively working with engaging  people in the communities.  *MoV:* Lists of organizers in each triangle; biannual activity reports from each of the Permanent Footprints. | 2.1.1 Establishment of 30 “Permanent Footprints” in 30 communities to strengthen SUDF’s grasp within local communities, making organizing much more direct, effective and measurable.  *Output:* SUDF cells based in 30 local communities providing direct contact and strong mobilization potential. 60 new organizers are recruited based on the triangle structure in the Permanent Footprints. |
| 2.2. By May 2021, at least 3000 women and unemployed youth nationwide have participated in a survey on what issues are most salient to them.  *MoV:* Methodology guidelines and documents; survey responses; two reports based on survey results; participants lists and minutes from training workshop. | 2.2.1. Establishment of a research team within SUDF and development of methodology and supervision strategy for surveying and data collection. Training of the SUDF staff on how to collect and analyse data done by GA.  *Output:* Methodology for survey and data collection and supervision strategy. Improved knowledge of local issues. |
| 2.2.2 One training workshop (1 day out of 4) on how to conduct surveys for 30 organizers and 20 shop stewards (in connection with activity 1.2.1 and 3.1.1).  *Output:* Community organizers and shop stewards have capacity to conduct surveys in local communities. Plan for survey execution is made and shared among participants. |
| 2.2.3 Nationwide survey and subsequent reports on issues important to women and unemployed youth carried out by the 30 Permanent Footprints the communities.  *Output:* Evidence-based knowledge on concerns of target groups that will inform campaigning and People’s Charter. |
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| 2.3. By June 2021, 180 female and 100 male 100 youth leaders have been mobilized through regional and national events aimed at strengthening these groups within the democratic movement and centralizing issues of gender inequality and youth unemployment.  *MoV*: Programme and participant lists; Participant evaluation forms. | 2.3.1. Youth Unemployment Symposium for 100 youth leaders in local communities.  *Output:* 100 youth leaders have aligned their priorities, feeding into the campaign and advocacy work of SUDF and affiliates. |
| 2.3.2. Four Regional Gender Caucuses in each of the country’s regions for 20 delegates each.  *Output:* Through a bottom-up approach, 80 citizens have identified, discussed and shared local obstacles to women’s emancipation and provided input to how SUDF can employ a feminist strategy in the pursuit of democracy. |
| 2.3.3. National Gender Summit for 100 participants (women and men).  *Output:* 100 citizens have engaged with women’s emancipation as a necessary condition for system change. |
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|  | 2.4 By June 2021 SUDF and GA  have engaged in a dialogue with a potential additional donor. By January 2023 SUDF has found at least one additional donor.  MoV. Copies of mail and an internal evaluation from SUDF. | 2.4.1 Meetings with new potential donors.  Output: SUDF has a diversified funding. |
|  | 2.5 By June 2021 SUDF has held a seminar with representatives from the SUDF leadership, with the  purpose of making a plan for generating income from other sources than GA including adding membership fees to SUDF from the affiliates.  MoV: A plan for how SUDF can receive income from other sources than GA. | 2.5.1 Economic seminar with SUDF staff, NEC and the Steering Committee. |
| 3. SUDF has sustained and amplified campaigning and mass mobilizations using new strategies. | 3.1 By February 2022, SUDF has empowered its organizers and affiliates in campaigning and direct action strategies used for mobilizing and creating awareness on the coming mass mobilizations.  *MoV:* Programme and participant lists from workshop; teaching materials for action strategies; minutes from meetings. | 3.1.1. One training workshop (1 days out of 4) on organizing, mobilizing and campaigning in hostile environments (as a preparation for “marshalling” a sit-in demonstration) for 30 community organizers and 20 shop stewards (in connection with activity 1.2.1 and 2.2.2).  *Output:* 50 organizers have been trained on direct action strategies, strengthening the SUDF base’s ability to mass mobilize. |
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| 3.1.2. An initial preparation by 30 core organizers engaging women and unemployed youth in local communities for the Mass Demonstration in demand of a People’s Government (done together with activity 2.2.3).  *Output:* Creating awareness ahead of the Mass Demonstration in demand of a People’s Government. |
| 3.1.3. Mobilization in the communities done by the 9 affiliates before the Mass Demonstration in demand of a People's Government and the People’s March for People’s Democratic Power.  *Output:* Increasing local knowledge of SUDF’s democratic movement and ensuring high attendance rates for the Mass Demonstration in demand of a People's Government and the People’s March for People’s Democratic Power the mass mobilizations. |
| 3.2 By February 2022, at least 9000 people have participated in (one of) two mass demonstrations with a civil disobedience “sit-in” strategy, and created public awareness of their movement for democracy.  *MoV*: Photo and video documentation (including livestreams) from the demonstrations. | 3.2.1. Mass Demonstration in demand of a People's Government with at least 4500 demonstrators in Manzini.  *Output*: Increased awareness of the democracy movement led by SUDF in Swaziland. |
| 3.2.2. People’s March for People’s Democratic Power with at least 5200 demonstrators in Manzini.  *Output:* Mass mobilization creating direct pressure on the regime. |
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| 3.3 By June 2022, SUDF has tripled its outreach on social media from the 2020 baseline.  *MoV:* Posts on Facebook; number of interactions with posts; followers on Facebook. | 3.3.1. Social Media training for the SUDF staff done by GA (as a follow-up on the Media and communications training done in the current intervention).  *Output:* Increased outreach on social media. |
| 3.3.2. Establishment of a SUDF media team to oversee SUDF’s media efforts and create continuous content for social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter and Whatsapp).  *Output:* Strong social media presence to engage broadly and voice the need for a democratic change. |
| 3.3.3 Weekly boosted posts on the Swaziland United Democratic Front News 24/7 platform.  *Output:* Increased traffic and followers. |
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In pursuit of the overall objective: *SUDF has consolidated and deepened the operational capacity of the democratic movement in Swaziland, to mobilize marginalized groups, and ultimately, to achieve sustainable democratic change* in mind, this intervention has three immediate objectives that all complement each other and hence are overlapping:

**Immediate Objective 1:** *SUDF will develop and adopt a feminist strategy internally and build capacity among its affiliate organisations to integrate a feminist perspective in all activities.* In recognition of the need of taking a feminist approach to work for democratic change, activities 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.1., 1.2.2 work to develop and centralize a feminist approach and female leadership internally in SUDF leadership and affiliates. By learning from like-minded feminist organizations in Southern Africa, this focus will pervade not only the revised organizational strategy and the new 2022 People’s Charter, it will be a present element in every activity of this project. The external consultant Venitia Govender (see section 2.4) will continue to support the work of SUDF by helping them with the formulation and incorporation of a feminist strategy (activity 1.1.1 and 1.1.3) Additionally, Venitia Govender will take part in the National Gender Summit (activity 2.3.3) and the workshop on feminism in praxis (Activity 1.2.1)

The update of the People’s Charter from 2012 will be a contemporary presentation of the demands of these people (activity 1.1.3). The charter is significant for several reasons; it shows how SUDF has grown both as an organisation, but also how they have learned from previous challenges. Losing TUCOSWA as an affiliate, but bringing them back in because they managed to create a common understanding for how they work, and what it means to work with SUDF, has made it more clear what SUDF expects from their affiliates and vice versa. Secondly, it also shows that SUDF have 'matured' on an organisational level, and how this also prevents the possibility for future conflicts similar to this. The charter serves as guidelines for the common work shared by SUDF and their affiliates and also how they wish to do things in the future. The charter needs an update because of the constantly changing situation in Swaziland, as well as their increasing capacity to advocate for groups in civil society.

**Immediate Objective 2**: *SUDF will consolidate its position as central to the democratic movement and expand its outreach and network by engaging new strategic target groups and partners in the region.*

The current and previous interventions showed that the target groups of this intervention are strategically necessary to toppling the monarchical regime. The democratic movement will be strengthened by providing them with a platform for voicing their grievances, further consolidating SUDF’s leading role for change. By building strong-rooted organisational infrastructure in local communities (activity 2.1.1) across the country, engaging these target groups by creating spaces for them to share and strategize (activities 2.3.1-2.3.3) and conducting nationwide surveys aimed at identifying the grievances of these groups (activities 2.2.1-2.2.3), we will ensure that the campaigns and mobilizations of SUDF are timely, relevant to the people and tap into public discontent with the regime. These initiatives will triple the number of organizers. The survey is carried out to ensure legitimacy in representing the two marginalized groups, namely women and unemployed youth (activity 2.2.3). Simultaneously, the surveys will be strong advocacy tools as they directly convey the voice and needs of the people in question. GA will capacity build SUDF in conducting surveys in conjunction with the first monitoring visit.

Furthermore, SUDF will take economic consequences due to COVID-19 and the economic dependency on CISU and GA into account in making a plan for a sustainable economic future involving seeking for additional funders (activities 2.4.1, 2.5.1) which will also ensure ownership of SUDF by the broad SUDF leadership.

**Immediate objective 3:** *SUDF will execute sustained and amplified campaigns and perform mass mobilizations based on a new feminist strategy.*

SUDF has in the last intervention shown their ability to organise and mobilise successful demonstrations, and will in this intervention build on their momentum to  mobilise even more people in two “sit-in” mass mobilisations (activities 3.2.1, 3.2.2). It is assumed that they will be able to mobilise more people this year, because of the localisation of their organisation and their targeted inclusion of women and unemployed youth. The mass mobilisation will be carried out with face masks and hand sanitizer making it possible to gather despite of COVID-19. In the light of COVID-19, a future lockdown is hard to foresee (but likely to happen) making it likely that Swaziland will face restrictions on gatherings, thus it is plausible that SUDF will have to postpone the mass demonstrations (see section 3.5). SUDF will use the method of “sit-ins” as a form of direct action. The protesters will together advocate for specific demands of the civil society, and will not move before at least some of their demands are met.There is an obvious need to maintain pressure on the regime by amplifying campaign efforts (activities 3.2.1-3.2.2) and numbers on the street (activities 3.1.1-3.1.3). For this, the project intends to take new and bolder measures in terms of sit-in tactics that speak to the demands of the target groups, as will be revealed in the survey and conferences (activities 1.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.3.1). Regular posts and live streaming of events to create a broader awareness are necessary and useful tools that will be of a high priority in this project (activities 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3). The investment in a Public Announcement (PA) system will mean improved coordination and communication during the campaigns and mass mobilizations.

The planned activities are adjusted to the COVID-19 situation. At present masks are mandatory in Swaziland and the maximum allowed number of people at a gathering is 100.  This implies that there will be provided the necessary masks, sanitisers and other protection to the SUDF-staff, organizers and others voluntarily working for SUDF. Also this protection is provided for the participants at seminars, conferences, meetings, workshops (activities 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.4.1, 2.5.1, 3.1.1 and 3.1.3). Furthermore, all activities have a maximum of participants of 100 persons. The COVID-19 situation has made it difficult to meet due to lockdowns and road blocks. Therefore, there are allocated costs to increased use of data and airtime. Also the intervention includes investments in smartphones to the organizers in order to maintain contact. This is specifically important when creating the permanent footprint (activity 2.1.1). In the event that the COVID-19 situation worsens and regulations change, it is possible to shift the implementation of some of the activities to online platforms by allocating of more funds towards acquisition of data and to invest in smartphones (activities regarding the strategy development 1.1.1-1.1.3) and the activities regarding consolidation of SUDFs position (activities 2.1.1., 2.2.1. and 2.5.1.) and activities regarding the outreach on social media (activities 1.3.3-3.3.3). The remaining part of the activities would be postponed or reworked to another format such as changing the venues to accommodate more people or people gathering with 2 meters of distance to each other or carried out outside in a big area (activities 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)  or carried out online.

**3.3 Development Triangle**

The elements of the development triangle: advocacy, capacity building and strategic services - are interdependent and mutually reinforcing in this intervention. For instance, increasing the capacity of the organisation involves focusing on the new target groups: women and the unemployed youth. This will strengthen both SUDF’s ability to mobilise these people for mass demonstrations, opening up the opportunity for dissent, expressing voice and hopefully, making *change* a real possibility in the public consciousness. In turn, a stronger, more organised mobilisation of people would strengthen advocacy efforts, both internal and external (see section 2.4). The ambition is that this would push the Swazi government to grant people more rights, and/or to open up for discussion.

Previous interventions have focused on strengthening organisational capacity, which now allow for greater weight to be placed on advocacy. However, the Corona crisis and ensuing crackdown on civic space emphasises the importance of maintaining both capacity building and strategic deliveries to maintain the momentum of the democratic movement. The nine affiliates have different strengths and will be drawn upon for all elements of the development triangle. For instance, SRWA will be instrumental in designing a feminist strategy and SNUS will play a key role in mobilising students for protests.

In this intervention, the weight in the development triangle lies on advocacy. Two main types of advocacy will be undertaken. Focus will lie on grassroots advocacy, which involves garnering support for the democratic movement in the new target groups. Various capacity building activities such as the youth symposium (activity 2.3.1), training shop stewards in feminist practices (1.2.1), establishing the Permanent Footprints in 30 communities (2.1.1),, and workshops (1.1.1, 1.2.1, 3.1.1) are the essential elements that will facilitate the dissemination of information and grow SUDF’s base. It will allow for more people to realise that system change is a necessary requirement for reducing inequality and ensuring access to rights. These people will add weight to the critical mass required for a successful campaign, following the ToC and pillars of power analysis (see section 1.2).

Furthermore, advocacy in the traditional sense, will also be used to a greater extent than before. A number of other actors and external actors that are critical of the monarchy have been outlined in section 2.4. Armed with strategic deliveries such as the survey (activity 2.2.3) and the people’s charter (1.1.3), SUDF will be better equipped to convince these actors that it is the primary democratic force in Swaziland today. In the context of an autocratic regime, where political parties and opposition is banned, mass mobilisations are key events during which people have a rare opportunity to express dissent. The ability to mobilise in this context will also amplify advocacy efforts, and demonstrate the strength of organisation and the peoples’ need for change. It is important to note that advocacy directed towards changing the minds of local politicians is difficult, as they benefit directly from upholding the status quo. This conclusion is also informed by the pillars of power analysis (section 2.1).

The establishment of a media team within SUDF (activity 3.3.1) will further strengthen the advocacy of marginalized groups by attracting more attention through campaigns on both social and traditional media. In the last intervention, they created a Facebook profile posting at least twice a month. In this intervention, they will build their social media profile, by boosting weekly posts on their social media platform. The development of SUDF’s social media profile and campaigns will also include the new practice of livestreaming the mass demonstrations. This is a powerful tool to further increase the outreach and visibility of SUDF.

Finally, in the project Push for a People’s Government, the SUDF team received training on media and communications by GA’s Policy and Campaign Officer. Activities 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 build on the capacity and learnings from this activity and seek to amplify the social media presence. The Media Team serves two main purposes in this intervention. The first is to publish the results of the surveys, in order to create awareness of challenges facing the women and the unemployed youth through campaigning. This will enable SUDF to advocate for the issues facing these all-too-often voiceless people. The second purpose is to develop their social media presence.

**3.4 Long-term sustainability of the intervention**

The partnership between SUDF and its affiliates is based on shared goals, and the organisations exist independently of one another. The affiliates are not financially dependent on SUDF and have their own sources of funding. This is beneficial, because this partnership does not jeopardize the affiliates after the intervention has expired, which both GA and SUDF are working hard to prevent. This intervention involves even more training of the community organisers in leadership, which is central for continuously boosting the empowerment of the society, and thereby, also strengthening the opportunity for a more permanent footprint, and volunteer driven projects not depending on remuneration. As described in section 2.4 and 3.2, SUDF are aware of the economic dependency on CISU and GA. However, this challenge is to be addressed in objective 2 and the activities related to that (2.4.1, 2.5.1). This will ensure that by the end of this intervention SUDF will not be completely dependent on funding from CISU and GA which will strengthen the ownership of SUDF by the leadership which will further strengthen the partnership between SUDF and GA in terms of economic sustainability.

**Lasting improvements for vulnerable groups**

We see the following tools as essential towards creating long-term sustainable interventions. Firstly, the tools that have been taught related to campaigns, media outreach and mobilization is not something that will disappear due to lack of funding. Instead they are valuable tools that can be taught to new affiliates and new members of SUDF. Secondly, by strengthening women’s position in both SUDF’s affiliates and in the local community, there is a higher possibility of creating a snowball-effect for political engagement. We believe that when the political engagement in the population is strengthened, there is a greater likelihood of representing the interests of the population in society in the long run. Therefore, the aim of the intervention is to allow these large but marginalised groups access to participate actively in society and demand their rights through SUDF. Not only will the intervention give a platform for those groups to voice their opinions and demands, but most importantly, it will give them agency to actively show their discontent with the status quo. Hence, this intervention pushes for political engagement and outreach in these marginalised groups which supports a long-term sustainable development regarding social justice in Swaziland. The strengthening of SUDF will further facilitate a coherent and meaningful movement that demands systemic change towards a civil democracy and holds the government accountable for its actions. It is our assumption that a democratically elected government responsible for the population will improve conditions for the poor and marginalized. Another important sustainable tool is the capacity building regarding feminism, by facilitating an opportunity for women to get leadership positions in SUDF and in the affiliates. This can potentially pave the way for other women to take leadership positions in the future, both in politics and in organisations.

**3.5 Mitigation of risks**

As described in section 1, SUDF and its affiliates operate in a fragile political environment, and the threat of violence, arrest, and torture is omnipresent for democratic voices in Swaziland. Poor economic performance has led to a growing frustration in civil society, which has been causing unrest, and could lead to increased violence from the authorities. Additionally, SUDF’s visibility is increasing, and while this is strategically important and necessary for the success of this intervention, this is making the need for precautions more important. The lack of basic human rights makes the planning of activities in local communities especially difficult, since many local chiefs forbid official meetings. Therefore, the main challenge for SUDF and the democratic movement is to direct the frustration in a political direction and keep violence at bay.   
  
SUDF recognises that their ability to mobilise greater numbers of people, also makes it less likely for the police to interfere, due to fear of escalating violence and the situation getting out of control, which would create too much negative awareness. Therefore, a vital precaution is to mobilise a great amount of people, and keep the masses non-violent. The mass mobilisations will, therefore, be controlled by marshalls to make sure the protesters do not initiate violence. This is done through workshops leading up to their mass-based actions mentioned in (activity 1.2.1, 2.2.2 and 3.1.1). SUDF has also intensified its training in first aid, and safety tactics to equip organisers, the leadership team and the staff with the skills needed to navigate in an hostile environment. They have learned from experience that when the situation escalates during the mass mobilisations the leaders and prominent people of SUDF and its affiliates, who are likely targets of the police, spread out in different geographical areas, to ensure they cannot easily track them all down. Moreover, SUDF will use the method of live streaming the mass mobilisation, and additionally, have hidden cameras to capture police violence, in case of violence.   
The fear of infiltration, arrests, and office raids are used by the regime to intimidate people into silence. Attempts have been made by the state to increase its cyber surveillance. In a written statement, issued on the 30th of January 2020, the National police commissioner William Dlamini said that the law will deal harshly with people criticizing the king on social media. The risks from the increased cyber surveillance of political activities will be dealt with, by having a third party, GA, to publish the information material on social media, in order to ensure that the members of the media team cannot easily be traced by the authorities.   
  
Therefore, there will be continued legal support to help SUDF’s staff and its affiliates. The project has budgeted for professional legal support for those who encounter confrontations with the authorities. The strengthening of SUDF, both within Swaziland, and on an international level, will ensure that there are sufficient demands for the release of anyone that is imprisoned without a fair trial. Drawing on experience, SUDF and GA recognize that the exposure in international media is considered a threat by the regime, due to the fear that international funding and export partners will retreat. Furthermore, GA has a fund called Mandela Fonden that is used to fundraise additional funds in case of arrests within GA’s partner organisations.

As mentioned in section 3.2 the COVID-19 context is taken into account in the execution of all the specific activities. Another total lock-down would prevent the affiliates, staff and target groups from meeting. If the situation changes drastically GA and SUDF will touch bases for making a detailed plan B for the intervention to be carried out. As for now, 100 people can legally gather in Swaziland making most activities doable except for the mass demonstrations (activities 3.2.1, 3.2.2). We expect that the mass demonstrations, which are to be held late in the intervention, can be carried out successfully by including distance between the participants.

Other risks concerning the political environment in Swaziland that needs to be mitigated is the instance of an implosion whether it be environmental in terms of a natural disaster or politically or economically in terms of a collapse of the economy in Swaziland or regime per se. This would restrict the civic space drastically making this intervention even more important since this intervention will empower the SUDF leadership as well as mobilizing the masses. As mentioned, the People’s Charter and the survey (activities 1.1.1.3, 2.2.3) will respectively and specifically provide a political and strategic fundament for SUDF and provide evidence-based knowledge on the concerns and needs of the target groups that can be most useful for SUDF in a situation where the leadership would need to take over the political agenda in the country. Lastly, if the regime decides to target and shut down SUDF completely, the organisation of SUDF into subgroups and organizers will ensure that the function of SUDF can still be carried out as the ownership and know-how are spread out into organizers covering all of Swaziland’s rural and urban areas. The legal support and trauma support will further insure SUDF in this situation. Thus, we expect that all objectives can be fulfilled taking the mentioned precautions into account.

**3.6 Monitoring and evaluation**

The monitoring and evaluation of the intervention is based on the guidelines from “Danske Handicaporganisationer’s Monitoring and Evaluation Manual”, in which monitoring is defined as an “ongoing and systematic watching over of activities and outputs.” Additionally, the survey (activity 2.3.2) will serve as a baseline for the collection of this data. In the monitoring, the partners will evaluate whether or not the immediate objectives are reached, through the monitoring of the indicators from the LFA. Hence, the means of verification serves as a direct tool for monitoring each of the indicators. The monitoring and evaluation will include quarterly narrative and financial reports by SUDF, followed up by a skype session, where the reports will be discussed. This is important to ensure that we get on-going information about the execution of the activities. Additionally, we include 3 visits and 1 online visit; an online startup visit, 2 monitoring visits , and lastly, a finalisation visit. SUDF is experienced in monitoring and evaluating their activities, and these procedures have been successful in the past interventions.   
  
The online start-up visit is where we will agree upon the means of monitoring and evaluation, including meetings with the target groups and the stakeholders in the intervention. We will plan on when the means of verification will be collected, as well as who will be responsible for collecting them. Furthermore, we will develop a joint format for the narrative and financial reporting, which will be used throughout the intervention. GA will instruct the Danish group in doing monitoring online as preparation to this.

Additionally, an external consultant from the region will be hired to make an external evaluation. The monitoring visits contain carrying out in-depth monitoring and review of the progress, activities, and the budget. Lastly, during the finalisation visit the external consultant will join and we will do a final evaluation of the indicators and immediate objectives, as well as discussions on the outcome of the intervention and the lessons learned, which will be used for future collaboration, as well as ensuring an optimal phase-out of the intervention

**4. Intervention-related information work in Denmark**

All of GA’s projects automatically feed into GA’s campaign and information work. The aim is to link local struggles and issues to broader regional and global structures of inequality and injustice, for instance by lobbying and doing advocacy work that GA does to create awareness on the struggle in Swaziland. The activities are developed together with the involved south partners and the activist groups in GA are responsible for the coordination of the activities in collaboration with the secretariat and relevant working groups.

The main purpose of GA’s information and campaign work is to inform the Danish population, which is the overall target group, about Swaziland since most people do not even know that Swaziland exists. Next, GA seeks to engage relevant actors such as politicians, companies, and other stakeholders. However, each activity always seeks to address a more specific target group related to the concrete interests and themes addressed. The activities can be anything from signing a petition, sending letters to politicians, or participating in street actions, conferences and workshops.  Based on good results from previous campaigns, GA has developed a number of fixed elements and channels that we use in our campaigns such as articles used for Facebook and GA’s website, monthly newsletters (sent out to more than 7000 subscribers), social media posts (including posting information material from SUDF on GA’s social media channels to ensure that the SUDF media team cannot be held legally accountable for it), graphic material (small videos, infographic), public meetings, film screenings, street based happenings and fact based reports.